ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES OF COOPERATIVE
ASSOCIATIONS
JOHN HANNA*

Cooperative associations other than agricultural are subject to the same rules
on restraint of trade as other corporations.1 Agricultural cooperatives in their normal
marketing and purchasing activities have nothing to fear from state antitrust legislation. Without any exemption in federal antitrust laws, the state and federal
legislative approval of farm cooperatives, expressing a widespread public confidence
in the utility of cooperative enterprise, would likely have induced the courts to
conclude that the slight and incidental restraints on trade by agricultural associations
in their normal operations are not unreasonable. To make this certain, agricultural producers' cooperatives are granted a degree of immunity by the Clayton Act,
the Capper-Volstead Act, and the Robinson-Patman Act. This immunity is not absolute, but so long as the agricultural associations conduct themselves with some
sense of responsibility and refrain from conspiring with non-agricultural interests,
the antitrust laws need not be of much concern to those who formulate the policies
of the associations. This .conclusion could have been and was reached by most
students of agricultural cooperatives during the rapid expansion from 192o to X930,
and requires no modification today.
Farmers expressed their sense of economic insecurity during the latter part of
the nineteenth century, and later, by enthusiastically aiding in the passage of state
antitrust laws and the Sherman Act. They tried, sometimes successfully, to have
their own organizations exempted from the penal provisions of these statutes. Where
they were unsuccessful they often found that their first feeble attempts at cooperative action were held to be illegal, while the enlargement of business units continued with only minor setbacks.2 Where they were successful the outcome in
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See Hanna, Co.Operative issociationsand the Public, 29 Mici. L. Rav. 148 (1930); CooperativeMilk
STATus op
Marketing and Restraint of Trade, 23 Ky. L. J. 217 (1935). See also Notusr, Tim LECGAL
AmucuLxuRAx Co-OPERATION 216-217, 334-423 (1927).
2
In Reeves v. Decoral" Farmers' Co-operativE Society, x6o Iowa 194, 140 N.W. 844 (1913), a provision that a member of a hog growers' association should ship all hogs through the association or pay
five cents a hundredweight on hogs shipped otherwise was held in restraint of trade as to an independent buyer. Apparently the Iowa court thought that any cooperative contract which adversely affected
an existing middleman was illegal.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers' Association, 155 Ill. x66, 39 N. .
651 (x895), held a milk producers' cooperative violated a state antitrust law merely because the
x,5oo members agreed to market all their milk through their association.
See also Bums v. Wray Farmers' Grain Co., 65 Colo. 425, 176 Pac. 487 (xgx8).
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several instances was the invalid'tion of the entire state antitrust law as a violation
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 3
Following World War I there was a notable development of agricultural cooperatives, especially marketing associations. Most of the states passed new cooperative statutes having a high degree of similarity. These statutes generally contained sections exempting agricultural cooperatives from the application of the
state antitrust laws, so long at least as the cooperatives merely carried on the activities authorized by statute. The Federal Government through the War Finance
Corporation and other agencies actively assisted agricultural associations by advice
and financial assistance. The state courts recognized the overwhelming public
opinion to the effect that the normal operations of cooperative associations of
farmers were not in unreasonable restraint of trade. They further upheld the
statutory exemption from the antitrust laws as reasonable classification. State judicial opinion was confirmed by federal judges and by the Supreme Court.4 The
present judicial attitude is illustrated by the following quotations from Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Tigner v. Texas.5 Referring to antitrust legislation following the Civil War, he says:
2 The leading case on this point is Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 84 U. S. 540 (1902). The
Connolly case involved an Illinois antitrust law which stated: "The provisions of this act shall not
apply to agricultural products or live stock while in the hands of the producer or raiser." Id. at 554.
There was no simple legislative declaration that farmers' association activities were not to be regarded
as in restraint of trade. The act.in question said, in effect, "certain acts are unlawful except when done
by farmers." The Court, after enumerating the forbidden items of conduct which farmers could do
without penalty, concluded the statute was repugnant to equal protection.
'Even as interpreted above the Connolly case apparently is no longer law. It was distinguished in
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-op. Ass'n, 276 U. S. 71 (1928), and apparently overruled by Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141 (1940).

5310 U. S. 141 (1940). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in delivering the opinion of the Court with bur
one dissent, said: "The court below recognized that the exemption was identical with that deemed
fatal to the Illinois statute in Connolly's case. But it felt that time and circumstances had drained
that case of vitality... ." Id. at 144. After reviewing the Texas and other legislation and the economic
situation of farmers and others, the learned Justice observed: "And so we conclude that to write into
law the differences between agricultural and other economic pursuits was within the power of the
Texas legislature. Connolly's case has been worn away by the erosion of time and we are of the
opinion that it is no longer controlling." Id. at 147.
The changing course of decision may be seen by noting the cases cited in L. S. HUx.Enr, LEGAl.
PHsSEs oF CooPERATsva

AssocrsAroNs 207 and passim (FARM CREDIT ADmiNiSRAToN,

U. S. DEP'T' oF

AoRIc., BULL. No. 5o, 1942). This volume also contains an exhaustive table of cases and bibliography.
See especially List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 114 Ohio 36, 151 N. E. 471 (1926);
Stark Company Milk Producers Ass'n v. Tabeling, 129 Ohio 159, z94 N. E. 16 (934); Northern Wisconsin Co-op Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 57r, 197 N. W. 936 (1923); Liberty Warehouse Co.

v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 276 U. S. 71 (1928); Tigner v. Texas, supra note 3. Frost v.
Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 278 U. S. 515 (x929), indicates that the state classifications may
not always be upheld as constitutional, but the case today, if authority at all, is probably of restricted
application. See Hanna, supra note, I, at 185.
The standard cooperative marketing act of the Twenties is set out and analyzed in Join HAN,
LAW Os1COOPERATIVE MARKET7NG AssocuTroNs (1931). See also CowLiNG, CoosEs.AtrvEs IN AmERICA
(x938); FRANK EvANs, ThE TsEND oF Jlmlcx.. DECISION IN COOPERATIVE MARKETINo (1925); FRANK
EvANs ,NIo E. A. Sroiviy,

OF

TIM ORGANIZATION

THE LAw oF CooPEt'rzvE MARKETING (r937); ISsa.L PACKEL, TkE LAW
OF COOPERATIEs (2d ed. 1947)-

AND OPERATION

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws presented in 1936 a Uniform
Agricultural Cooperative Association Act, subsequently designated a model Act. This Act was drafted

490

LAW AND CONnEMPoRARY PROBLEMS

Law was invoked to buttress the traditional system of free competition, free markets and
free enterprise. Pressure for this legislation came more particularly from those who as
producers, as well as consumers, constituted the most dispersed economic groups. These
large sections of the population-those who labored with their hands and those who
worked the soil-were as a matter of economic fact in a different relation to the community from that occupied by industrial combinations .... In these circumstances,
legislators may well have thought combinations of farmers and stockmen presented
no threat to the community, or, at least, the threat was of a different order from that
arising through combinations of industrialists and middlemen ....
.An impressive legislative movement bears witness to the general acceptance of
the view that differences between agriculture and industry call for differentiation in the
formulation of public policy.8

Before discussing federal legislation designed to relieve agricultural associations
from some of the applications of the antitrust laws, a few words may be added to
emphasize the statement that non-agricultural cooperative associations have little
or no such state or federal legislative immunity.7
the Associaed Press case:8

As Mr. Justice Black stated in

by the author. Its restraint of trade section is a synthesis of state law on restraint of trade and reads as
follows:
Sec. 20. AssOciA77oNs AE Nor iN Rxs'rsAmr oF TRADE. (a) No association complying with the terms
hereof shall be deemed to be a conspiracy, or a combination in restraint of trade, or an illegal monopoly;
or be deemed to have "been formed for the purpose of lessening competition or fixing prices arbitrarily,
nor shall the contracts between the association and its members, or any agreements authorized in this
act, be construed as an unlawful restraint of trade, or as part of a conspiracy or combination to accomplish an improper or illegal purpose or act.
(b) An association may acquire, exchange, interpret and disseminate to its members, to other cooperative associations, and otherwise, past, present and prospective, crop, market, statistical, economic and
other similar information relating to the business of the association, either directly of through an agent
created or selected by it or by other associations acting in conjunction with it.
(c)An association may advise its members in respect to the current and prospective production of
agricultural commodities and its relation to the prospective volumes of consumption, selling prices and
existing or potential surplus, to the end that every market may be served from the most convenient
productive areas under a program of orderly marketing that will assure adequate supplies without
undue enhancement of prices or the accumulation of any undue surplus.
6
Tigner v. Texas, supra note 5, at 145, 146.
'A-review of the studies made by the Cooperative Project on Cooperative Legislation, with particular
reference to consumer cooperation, indicates that non-agricultural cooperatives have rarely been given
any specal position in respect to laws on the subject of restraint of trade. Ostrolenk and Tereshtcnko,
Abstracts of Laws Pertainingto Cooperatives in the United States, FWA, WPA, Projects Nos. 65-1-97-21
and 465-97-3-x8. This project was subsequently a section of the Department of Labor. See Bull. No.
665. Some of the Department's later studies of cooperatives were not printed but made available in
mimeographed form to certain libraries and others.
OAssociated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945). The implications of this case for cooperatives will be discussed at greater length infra. The Associated Press, with some 1200 members, is
a cooperative association incorporated under the Membership Corporation Law of the State of New
York. Roberts, J., dissenting, id. at 48. The very history of the Associated Press further illustrates
this point as Black, J., declared: "AP originally functioned as an Illinois corporation, and at that time
an existing member of the Association had an absolute veto power over the application of a publisher
who was or would be in competition with the old member. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that
AP thus operated was in restraint of trade. Inter-Ocean Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 184 111.438,
56 N. E. 822 (ioo). As a result of this decision, the present Association was organized in New
York." Id. at zo. See also American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U. S. 519 (x943). C/.
Lerin, The Associated Press Decision, 13 U. oF Cm. L. REV. 247 (1946); Ellis, A Reply, id. at 471.
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Victory of a member of such a combination over its business rivals achieved by such
collective means cannot consistently with the Sherman Act or with practical, everyday
knowledge be attributed to individual "enterprise and sagacity"; . . . [it] can only be
.. . the collective power of an unlawful combination.... It is significant that when
Congress has desired to permit cooperatives to interfere with the competitive system of
business, it has done so expressly by legislation.9
This is not to say that by their nature, size4 and operations most consumers' and
other cooperative corporations may not carry on their activities with little fear of
being called to account for unlawful interference with competition.
Numerous federal statutes are relevant in considering the applicability to agricultural cooperatives of United States statutes on the subject of restraint of trade.
In the first category are the antitrust acts themselves; in the second are acts indicating federal approval of the activities of such associations. The first group includes
the Clayton Act,10 the Capper-Volstead Act,"' the Robinson-Patman Act,12 and
various acts in which incidental reference is made to antitrust laws, such as the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act' s and the Bituminous Coal Act.14 The
Appropriations Acts for the Department of Justice from 19i4 to I92815 contained the

following provision:
,.. no part of this appropriation shall be expended for the prosecution of producers
of frm products and associations of farmers who cooperate and organize in an effort
to and for the purpose to obtain and maintain a fair and reasonable price for their
products.
A partial list of federal statutes indicating government support of farm cooperative associations includes: the War Finance Corporation Act of x918,16 the Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank Act of I923,17 the Agricultural Marketing Act of i929,"8
Press v. United States, supra note 8, at 15 , 14.
8 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 1 5 U.S.C. §§12-27 (1940).

*Associated

'1

3

42 STAT. 388 (1922),

is49 STAT. 1526 (936),
is50 STAT. 248 (1937),

7 U.S.C. §§291-292

(1940).

15 U.S.C. §§13-13c (1940).
7 U.S.C. §1671-674 (1940).

Ie Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
(58(2)) 48 STAT. 34, referring to agreements by the Secretary of Agriculture with cooperative associations, among others, provides: "The making of any such agreement shall not be held to be in violation
of any of the antitrust laws of the United States." While this Act was declared unconstitutional for
reasons having nothing to do with the foregoing provision, United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1
(x935), the policy of the original Act was colitinued in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of
1937: "The Secretary, in the administration of [this chapter] shall accord such recognition and encouragement to producer-owned and producer-controlled cooperative associations as will be in harmony
with the policy toward cooperative associations set forth in existing Acts of Congress and as will tend
to promote efficient methods of marketing and distribution." 49 STAT. 767 (1935), 50 STAT. 246 (937),
7 U.S.C. §6xo(b) (1) (i94o).
The discriminatory sections of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act exempting producers' cooperatives from the requirement of paying uniform prices were upheld in United States v. Rock Royal
Cooperative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533 (1939).
"The Bituminous Coal Act of 1935 contained exculpating clauses relating to sale to or through
farmers' cooperatives. When the Act was declared unconstitutional, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U. S 235 (1936), it was reenacted with the same clauses mentioned above. 50 STAT. 82 (1937), 15
U.S.C. §83 3 (i) (1940).
"See, e.g., 41 STAT. 336-337 (1919).
1s 40 STAT. 5o6 (I918), as amended, see 15 U.S.C. §§331-374 (1940).
1742 STAT. 1454,

12 U.S.C. §102r (1940).

"s46

STAT.

11 (1929), 12 U.S.C. §1141

(1940).
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the Farm Credit Act of 1933 authorizing the banks for cooperatives,1 the Rural
Electrification Act of 1936,20 the Packers and Stockyards Act of I92,21 the Grain
Futures Act of I92,22 the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936,28 the Cooperative
Marketing Act of 192624 providing for research and advisory services for coopera-

tives by the Department of Agriculture, and the tax-exemption provisions of various
revenue acts. 25
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of I89026 ,prohibited "every . . . combination ...
in restraint- of trade or-commerce." The question whether the 18go Congress which
passed the law intended it to apply to labor unions or producer organizations is now
outside the realm of useful inquiry. The Clayton Act was passed in 1914 to
supplement the Sherman Act. When the Clayton Act was under consideration, an
alternate amendment was offered in the following language:
Provided, That this Act shall not be construed to apply to any arrangements, agreements or combinations between laborers made with a view of lessening the number of
hours of their labor or the increasing of their wages; nor to any arrangements, agreements, or combinations among persons engaged in horticulture or agriculture made with
a view of enhancing the price of [their own] agricultural or horticultural products. 27
The amendment was defeated.28 An amendment to include an exemption of
consumer organizations was also rejected. 9 Congress included in Section 6 of the
Clayton Act the famous sentence, "That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce."8 0 Since the interpretation of the labor clauses of
this section have some bearing upon the meaning of the cooperative clauses, before
seeing how Section 6 and subsequent legislation have been understood in the matter of the competitive privileges of agricultural associations it may be worth while
to digress for a few observations on the application of the section to labor-union
practices 8 l
§§Ix34, 1134(f) (940).
1363 (1936), 7 U.S.C. §9o (1940).
159, 7 U.S.C. §18x (1940).
998, 1001. See Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1922).
1491 (1936), 7 U.S.C. §I (1940).
2444 STAT. 802, 7 U.S.C. §451 (1940).
"For the present law see Internal R'venue Code §ioi(i2). The law has remained about the same
since 1926. See also Paul, The Justifiability of the Policy of Exempting Farmers"Marketing and Parchasers' Cooperative Organizations from Federal Income Taxes, 29 MNN. L. REv. 343 (945).
"Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), I5 U.S.C. §1 (1940). Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730, i5 U.S.C.
S12 (1940). Section 6 is as follows: "That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help,
and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of
such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations,
or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of
trade, under the antitrust laws." 38 STAT. 731.
2T51 CoNG. REc. 9540 (1914).
"Id. at 9541.
"38 STAT. 731.
2Ibid.
"Section 20 of the Clayton Act also restricted the authority of the Federal courts to issue injunctions
in labor cases, a matter more comprehensively covered later in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70
(1932), 29 U.S.C. §10X (1940). Section 20 can be interpreted to legalize, regardless of purpose, most
of the usual tactical weapons of labor unions.
19 48 STAT. 257, 261, 12 U.S.C.

49 STAT.
2142 STAT.
2212 STAT.
"*49 STAT.
20
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Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for the Court in the Apex Hosiery case,3 2 a decision
highly favorable to labor, said: "During that period [since 19o8] Congress, although
often asked to do so, has passed no act purporting to exclude labor unions wholly
from the operation of the [Sherman] Act."33 That was and is the opinion of the
Supreme Court as to the effect of Section 6 of the Clayton Act.3 4 On the other
hand, it has been strenuously argued not only that judicial construction applying
the Sherman Act to labor unions was erroneous but that the congressional intent
in 1914 was to exclude labor unions entirely from the purview of the act.
Joseph Kovner, in discussing the legislative history of the Clayton Act,3 5 quotes
the chairman of the House Rules Committee, Mr. Henry, as stating: "We are now
about to ...

make it plain and specific, by clear-cut and direct language, that the

anti-trust laws against conspiracies in trade shall not be applied to labor organizations.. .

.""

Mr. Kovner goes on to discuss the hearings, the debates in the House

and Senate and the amendments that were offered and rejected, and concludes that
the legislative history indicates a congressional intent to exempt labor unions from
the impact of the Sherman law. He thinks the Supreme Court has in fact ignored
the legislative history. Mr. Kovner is bewildered that Frankfurter and Greene, in
The Labor Injunction, say, "The debates in Congress looked both ways" and, "With
a legislative history like that which surrounds the Clayton Act, talk about the legislative intent as a means of construing legislation is simply repeating an empty
formula."3' 7 Mr. Kovner is aware that members of Congress might have accepted
the formula of Section 6 in 1914 because they believed the Supreme Court would
interpret Section 6 as in fact it has been interpreted-namely, that labor unions
are exempted "only while pursuing legitimate objects by lawful means," 381 as indeed
the law states. The question is whether prior cases gave the clue to the meaning of
"lawful means." Mr. Kovner certainly proves the opinions of certain sponsors of
Section 6 as to its meaning. That the majorities who voted for the bill and who
were aware of Supreme Court opinions in situations covered by the section necessarily accepted the view of the law's proponents is by no means so apparent. While
the author seems to believe that the Supreme Court has never taken sufficient account of the legislative history, it is scarcely likely that briefs on behalf of labor
organizations have not explored the subject and brought the products of research
"*Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469 (1940).
'"'Id.at 487.

" Lawlor v. Loewe, 208 U. S. 274 (19o7), 235 U. S. 522 (1915).
"1KovNER, The Legislative History of Seetion 6 of the Clayton A4ct, 47 CoL. L. Rav. 749 (1947).
so
51 CoNO. RFc. 9541 (1914), quoted in id. at 749.
1
2 FEaLx FRANxPTRTER AND NATwt
GREENE, Tim LABoR INJU-cION 139-144 (I930), quoted in
Kovner, supra note 36, at 762.
"See Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 483 (19E6). This statement in the actual case
was in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney. It will not escape notice that in fact the learned
justice seems to say one ascertains whether the'statute punishes an act by deciding a priori whether the
act is unlawful. This view became law after Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1920). The
dissenters in the Duplex case, Brandeis, Holmes, and Clarke, JJ., based their dissent on Section 2o, not
Section 6, of the Clayton Act.
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to the attention of the Court. At any rate, the Court has never found the legislative intent for which Mr. Kovner argues 8 "
The limited exemption from antitrust prosecution granted to labor unions in
recent cases has resulted from reliance on the Norris-LaGuardia Act 9 and an
analysis of the general purposes of the antitrust laws rather than from the clauses
*of Section 6 -of the Clayton Act.
The Apex Hosiery case 40 involved a sit-down strike in its most aggravated form.
A union which at the time had only eight members out of the company's 2,5oo
employees demanded a closed shop. When this was refused the union declared a
strike, seized the plant, and held it for several weeks, during which machinery and
equipment was wantonly demolished or damaged to the extent of many thousands
of. dollars. About 8o per cent of the finished production was ready for shipment
in interstate commerce. The union specifically refused a request for shipment of
this merchandise. The plaintiff sued for triple damages under the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court, while denying that the Clayton Act absolutely exempted
labor unions from the provisions of the Sherman Act, found that, while the strikers
committed acts which were within reach of the commerce power, there was no
conspiracy in restraint of trade within the Sherman law. The tests to be applied
concern the nature of the restraints and the effect on interstate commerce. Restraints which, if peaceful, are not covered by the Act are not brought under the
Act because attained by violence. The purpose of the Sherman law was to preserve
free competition in business and commercial transactions and prevent conduct tending to restrict production, fix prices, or otherwise control the market. The Sherman
Act was not passed to police interstate commerce. In both labor and non-labor
cases, restraints condemned by the antitrust laws must be intended to have, or have,
effects on the competitive conditions in the industry. The Sherman Act is concerned with the character of the prohibited restraints rather than with their effects
on interstate commerce. The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Stone, and with
a dissent by Chief Justice Hughes concurred in by Justices McReynolds and Roberts, affirmed a Circuit Court of Appeals decision reversing a judgment for the
plaintiff.
In United States v. Hutcheson4 l the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment quashing an indictment under the Sherman Act. The indictment resulted from a strike
and secondary boycott and sympathy strikes growing out of a jurisdictional dispute.
It charged a conspiracy to restrain trade with the purpose of preventing AnheuserBusch from receiving materials in interstate commerce, of preventing another corporation from obtaining materials in interstate commerce for use in performing
a contract for Anheuser-Busch, and of preventing still another corporation from
""An interesting question, not here discussed, is how far, if at all, the Supreme Court should
explore legislative history, debates, and hearings, to interpret statutory language. Such procedure obviously tends to impress the Court with political considerations.
8947 STAT.

70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §1x
(1940).
"oApex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 Ty. S. 469 (1940).
&1312 U. S. 219 (1941).
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receiving materials in like manner for the .construction of a building for the Gaylord Container Corporation on premises adjacent to Anheuser-Busch.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, held that the
union actions were immune from prosecution under Section 2o of the Clayton Act,
construed in the light of the congressional definition of the term "labor dispute"
in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In view of the broad definition of "labor dispute,"
Congress had given protection in respect of the described conduct even if directed
in part against outsiders to the labor dispute. Congress had expressed a national
policy by determining the bounds of a labor dispute so far as related to withdrawal
of injunctions. Congress could not have taken such elaborate care to permit such
conduct in respect of one statute while retaining a criminal liability for such conduct under an earlier law. While the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not a tightly
drawn amendment to the Clayton Act, ,"The underlying aim . .. was to restore
the broad purpose which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton Act
but which was frustrated, so Congress believed, by unduly restrictive judicial construction. '42 Mr. Justice Stone, concurring, said it was clear that the indictment
failed to charge an offense under the Sherman Law and found no occasion to consider the impact of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The learned Justice thought the
restraints on interstate commerce were only those incidental to any local strike.
Mr. Justice Roberts, with whom Chief Justice Hughes agreed, thought the fact that
Congress forbade the issuing of injunctions to restrain certain conduct was no
indication that Congress intended to repeal provisions of the Sherman Act:
I venture to say that no court has ever undertaken so radically to legislate where
Congress has refused so to do.... In the light of this history, to attribute to Congress
an intent to repeal legislation which had a definite and well understood scope and
effect for decades past, by resurrecting a rejected construction of the Clayton Act and
extending a policy strictly limited by the Congress itself in the Norris-La Guardia Act,
seems to me a usurpation by the courts of the function of the Congress not only novel
but fraught as well with the most serious dangers to our constitutional system of division of powers. 43
Whether or not the effect of the Supreme Court decisions is that claimed by
Mr. Justice Roberts, the fact remains that if account is taken of Sections 6 and 20
of the Clayton Act, and of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, nothing a labor union or
its members can do can be invalid under the Sherman Act so long as there is a
labor dispute-that is, so long as the alleged offense comes within the matrix of the
employer-employee relationship; but the labor immunity does not extend to union
conduct outside such matrix, whether the union and its members are acting alone
or in concert with others.
Where a fish canner asked for an injunction against a CIO union of fishermen,
charging an attempt to monopolize, the Supreme Court held the injunction should
have been granted, reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals, which held there was
"d. at 235-236.
it Id. at 245, 246.
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no such jurisdiction.4 4 The defendant union was composed chiefly of owners and
lessees of fishing boats, although there were also involved a few individuals, also
members, who worked for other members. None of the respondents was employed
by the petitioner nor sought any such employment. The union required the petitioner not to purchase fish from non-members as a condition of getting any fish
from members. The union's control of the fish supply was so extensive that the
petitioner had the choice of yielding or going out of business. The actual decision
of the Supreme Court, a unanimous one, was that no labor dispute was involved.
The District Court had jurisdiction to consider the petition.
On the remand, the union argued that irrespective of the protection to which
it was entitled under the labor statutes, it was a cooperative association of fishermen
in whose behalf there has been enacted a statute similar to the Capper-Volstead
Act, with the Secretary of Commerce having much the same jurisdiction under the
former statute as the Secretary of Agriculture has under the latter.45 The Secretary
of Commerce had taken no action in respect to the alleged monopoly. The Circuit
Court of Appeals4" thought on this point that it was concluded by the Borden
case, 47 although, as will be noted subsequently, in that case the cooperative was
charged with conspiring with others, while in the California Packers' case48 the
defendant's monopoly power was being realized solely by an assertion of the power
of the fishermen's union. The circuit court affirmed the original judgment of the
district court in granting the injunction.
The Allen Bradley case 49 brought to the attention of the Supreme Court a com"Columbia River Packers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hinton. 315 U. S. 143 (1942). Further reference to this
case is made infra.
"538 STAr. 730, 15 U.S.C. §12 (1940).
"Hinton v. Columbia River Packers Ass'n, 131 F. 2d 88 (C.C.A. 9 th 1942).
"TUnited States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188 (1939).
48 See note 44 supra.
"Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797 (945).
For the current stage in this
litigation see Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, 164 F. 2d 71 (C.C.A. 2d 1947). See also United
Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395 (1947), where the question concerned the
nature of the authorization by the union to make it liable for acts of union officials in a conspiracy
to violate the Sherman Law. The Court did not find the authorization was proven. The point of
this last case seems now to be covered by §2(13) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.
See also §301(b) and (a) and 93 CoNG. REc. 7001 (1947). Pub. L. No. iox, 8oth Cong., ist Sess.
(1947). A review of the major antitrust labor decisions may be found in Pierce, Labor and the .nti.
Trua Laws, iS So. CAI.u. L. REv. *171 (1945).
This is not an article on labor unions and the antitrust laws, so no attempt is made to cite even
a selection from the voluminous writings on tfhis topic. Law review authors have attempted to find
a pattern in the labor decisions and to isolate a formula expressing the position of the Supreme Court.
The same thing has been happening for years in the commerce cases. Since the Justices of the Supreme
Court doubtless read the-reviews, and since several of them in the past have done the same sort of
analysis and synthesis, it is by no means impossible that out of a multitude of decisions of particular
cases often explained by inconsistent opinions writers will detect a controlling principle which will be
accepted subsequently by the Court. Cf. United States v. Local 807, 315 U. S. 521 (942).
This case
involved the Federal And-Racketeering Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 979, x8 U.S.C. §420 (1940) ), and
came to the Supreme Court on certiorari to review a judgment reversing a conviction of a union and
members. While the Clayton Act (§6 and §20) was mentioned in argument, it was not mentioned
in the opinions. The Act provided a penalty for any person who with relation to interstate commerce
obtains or attempts to obtain by use or threat of force payment of money, not including payment of
wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide employee. The defendants controlled New York City
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bination of contractors, manufacturers, and union which was designed, by the boycotting of recalcitrant local contractors and manufacturers and outside manufacturers, to gain market control of the electrical equipment business in the city of
New York. The question before the Court, in the words of Mr. Justice Black,
was, "Do labor unions violate the Sherman Act when, in order to further their own
interests as wage earners, they aid and abet business men to do the precise things
which that Act prohibits?"5 After reviewing the history of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, the labor legislation, and the leading Supreme Court decisions on
these subjects, the learned Justice continued:
The result of all this is that we have two declared congressional policies which it is
our responsibility to try to reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive business
economy; the other to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions
through the agency of collective bargaining. We must determine here how far Congress
intended activities under one of these policies to neutralize the results envisaged by the
others.
It must be remembered that the exemptions granted the unions were special ex5
ceptions to a general legislative plan. '
The Court concluded that the union had violated the Sherman Act. The
holding means that the same labor union activities may or may not be in violation
of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether the union acts alone or in combination with business groups. Mr. Justice Roberts, while agreeing with the conclusion, dissented from parts of the majority opinion. He pointed out that the
purpose of the union was to exclude from use in the city of New York articles of
commerce made outside the city and offered for sale to users within the city. It
was completely to monopolize the manufacture and sale of all electrical equipment within New York and to exclude from use in the area every such article
manufactured outside the city, whether in a closed union shop or not. Mr. Justice
Roberts thought such conduct by the union was illegal even without a combination with business:
The course of decision in this court has now created a situation in which by concerted
trucking. They wanted to compel out-of-state trucks to pay a day's trucking wages whenever such
trucks made direct deliveries to New York City assignees. This compulsion was exercised by defendants'
lying in wait for trucks passing from New Jersey to New York, forcing their way into trucks and by
beating or threats procuring from drivers or their employers the demanded payments. In some cases
they assisted or offered to assist in unloading the trucks; in others they disappeared as soon as the
money was paid. The Court, by Mr. Justice Byrnes (Chief Justice Stone dissenting), held that the
Act was intended to suppress terroristic activities of professional gangsters, not to interfere with
labor union activities. The exception in the Act was not limited to those who were employees prior
to the payment. The test as applicable to this case was whether the objective of the defendants was to
obtain the payment of wages, and not whether the intent of the truck owner was to pay for protection instead of service. The reversal of the conviction was affirmed.
In view of the subsequent history of federal labor legislation, leaders of the cooperative movement
contemplating the limits of conduct under their several immunities may recall the quotation: "Caesar
had his Brutus, Charles I his Cromwell, and George III . .. may profit by their example."
"*Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, supra note 49, at 8oz.
" ld. at 8o6, 8o9.
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action, unions may set up a wall around a municipality of millions of inhabitants against
importations of any goods if the union is careful to make separate contracts with each
employer, and if union and employers are able to convince the court that, while all
employers have such agreements, each acted independently in making them . . . notwithstanding the fact that the purpose and inevitable
result is the stifling of competition
52
in interstate trade and the creation of a monopoly.
Mr. Justice Murphy dissented, saying in part:
The fact that the union has expressed its self-interest with the aid of others rather
than solely by its own activities should not be decisive of statutory liability. What is
legal if done alone should not become illegal if done with the assistance of others and
with the same purpose in mind.53
Just as the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act constitute the charter
of privileges and immunities of the labor unions, so the Clayton Act and the Capper-Volstead Act fulfill the same purpose in respect of agricultural cooperativesnot, as has been noted, for other cooperatives. Consumers' cooperatives and cooperatives of other enterprises must meet any condemnation by the federal antitrust laws with only the defenses available to any others engaged in collective business effort.
Section 6 of the Clayton Act says that nothing contained in the antitrust laws
shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of agricultural or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual help and not having
capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Since the Clayton Act is not specific as to what are agricultural or horticultural
associations, and since its immunity does not extend to cooperatives having capital
shares, although a true cooperative may have capital shares and many of the older
cooperatives were so organized, the Capper-Volstead Act5 4 was passed in 1922
to clarify the cooperative exemptions. Cooperatives may be corporate or other
forms of association with or without share capital. Producers include farmers,
planters, ranchmen, dairymen, and nut and fruit growers. Associations may engage
in processing, preparing for market, and handling and marketing products of
members in interstate and foreign commerce. They may have marketing agencies
in common. Several requirements are enumerated, including the one-man-onevote principle, limitation of dividends on share capital to 8 per cent, and no dealing
in products of non-menbers to an amount greater in value than for members.
A significant omission is that there is no reference to purchasers' cooperative
associations, agricultural or other, although most state cooperative statutes contain
provisions permitting cooperative purchasing by associations of producers. While
"Id. at 819.

"' d. at

820.

54 42 STAT.

388

(1922),

7 U.S.C. §§291,

292 (1940).
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the latter type of association may conceivably come within the exemption of the
Clayton Act, this possibility finds no confirmation in the Capper-Volstead Act.
The Capper-Volstead Act recognizes that cooperative associations might become
monopolies and restrain trade. It provides that if the Secretary of Agriculture has
reason to believe that any such association monopolizes or restrains trade in interstate or foreign commerce, he may act to protect the public. Apparently the Secretary is not to act unless he believes that the monopoly or restraint of trade unduly
enhances prices. 55 Does this mean that monopoly or common marketing agencies
constituting combinations to fix prices are legal so long as the price is not too
high? Such a result would be illegal for any other combination under the authority
of the Trenton Potteries case, 56 in which the Supreme Court specifically refused
to consider the issue of fair price. Apparently the rule of the Trenton Potteries
case does not apply to farm marketing associations.
If the Secretary of Agriculture believes that an association is unduly enhancing
prices, he must serve a complaint with notice of hearing and conduct a hearing.
If he finds the association guilty he may issue a cease-and-desist order. Nothing
is said about the presentation of evidence by complainants against an association,
although the rule-making power given to the Secretary could presumably permit
the offering of testimony of outsiders, not voluntarily summoned by the Secretary.
If an association disobeys the order of the Secretary, the Attorney General may
institute proceedings in the federal district court to enforce the order. A decree of
the court may be enforced by "injunction or other appropriate remedy." The section is apparently not a penal statute, since nothing is said about punishment for
willful or other violation of the order of the Secretary. A violation of the court's
decree would undoubtedly be a contempt and punishable as such.
The leading case on the Capper-Volstead Act is United States v. Borden Company,5 7 decided in 1939. The case involved an indictment of five groups of defendants for violation of Section i of the Sherman Act. One group included milk
distributors, one was a cooperative association and its officers ,and agents, one was
a union and its officials, one certain municipal officials of Chicago, and one consisted
of certain individuals. The case came directly to the Supreme Court under the
Criminal Appeals Act for construction of a statute after the district court had dismissed the indictment. It was conteided that the acts complained of were those
both formerly and subsequently legal by governmental approval under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act.58 On this point the Court thought the offenses
charged were committed, if at all, during a period when the arrangements in question had not been licensed by the Secretary of Agriculture, and that the Act af"The language of the statute is: "If the Secretary of Agriculture shall have reason to believe that
any such association monopolizes or restrains trade in interstate or foreign commerce to such an extent
that the price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced by reason thereof ..
"
"United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927); accord, Socony Vacuum Oil Co.
v. United States, 310 U. S. 150 (1940).
5308
U. S. 188 (939), reversing 28 F. Supp. 177.
'Judicial Code §238, 28 U.S.C. §345, 50 STAT. 246 (1937), 7 U.S.C. §602 (1940).

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

500

forded no ground for construing the Sherman Act as inapplicable to three counts
in the indictment. The Court then considered whether the agricultural cooperative defendant, the Pure Milk Association, was exempt by reason of the CapperVolstead Act. Chief Justice Hughes quoted at some length the lower court
opinion, including the sentence:
The Capper-Volstead Act does not condemn any kind of monopoly or restraint of trade,
or any price fixing unless such monopoly or price fixing unduly enhances the price of
an agricultural product. The Act then, by section 2 thereof, commits to an officer of the
executive department, the Secretary of Agriculture, the power of regulation and visitation.
...The court deduces from the Capper-Volstead Act that the Secretary of Agriculture
has exclusive jurisdiction ...in the first instance ....

ture acts, the judicial power cannot be invoked.59

Until the Secretary of Agricul-

It is not altogether clear how much of this argument was rejected when the
Chief justice observed, "We are unable to accept that view." What the Court decided was that the Capper-Volstead Act "cannot be deemed to authorize any
combination or conspiracy with other persons in restraint of trade that these producers may see fit to devise." 0 What was condemned was the combined attempt
of all defendants, including distributors and their allies, to control the market.
The Court did not hold, since the question was not presented, that the cooperative
might not have fixed the price and the conditions of distribution, and compelled
their acceptance by separate contracts with other parties concerned.8 1
On the subject of the exclusiveness of the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Chief Justice said that Section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act does not
cover the entire field of the Sherman Law. He pointed out that the Sherman Act
authorizes criminal prosecution and penalties, while the Capper-Volstead Act provides only for a civil remedy. The Capper-Volstead Act speaks only of monopolization, while the earlier law also concerns attempts to monopolize. Furthermore,
the exemption statute says nothing about immunity in the absence of action by the
Secretary. These observations by the Chief Justice leave some questions unanswered, since the Court in the Borden case was dealing with a conspiracy between
producers and others. The Chief Justice seems to think that at least in the absence
of action by the Secretary the penal provisions of the Sherman Act could still be
invoked. It is at least arguable that the Capper-Volstead Act meant to free agricultural associations and their officers from criminal liability, although, as the Court
has often said, repeal by implication is not favored. Suppose the Secretary of Agriculture should decline to act. Would that decision be conclusive on the Department
of Justice, or even a decision by the Secretary that, since the price had not been
5

United States v. Borden Co., supra note 57, at 2o3, 204.
at 204-205.
" See United States v. Elm Spring Farm, 38 F. Supp. 5o8 (D. Mass. 1941), modified 127 F. 2d 920
6

1 Id.

(C.C.A Ist 1942).
Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 338 (1942), where the California Agriculture Prorate Act for
regulating marketing, including prices of California raisins, was held not within the intended scope,
nor a violation, of the Sherman Law. The Court regarded this as a regulation of local concern in
spite of the fact that most of the raisins were intended for interstate and foreign commerce.

ANrrrRusr ImMNmu

s oF CoomAivEs

enhanced, he should not issue any cease-and-desist order? Finally, it seems odd
that if a cooperative that had attained monopoly would be safe from prosecution
so long as it did not enhance prices, it could.be prosecuted during the process of
obtaining the monopoly. It must be remembered that the Chief Justice dissented
from the opinion of the majority in United States v. Hutheson,62 involving laborunion immunity under the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. His dissent is in accord with his reasoning in the Borden case. It is submitted that the
principle of deducing general legislative policy from several statutes, as announced
by the Supreme Court in the Hutcheson case, would grant the cooperative a greater
degree of immunity than suggested by the Chief Justice in the Borden case, although
63
the actual decision is in accord with the later cases.
If the congressional policy in limiting the application of the antitrust laws is
to equalize the bargaining power of worker and employer and of farmer associations and industrial corporations, 4 it may be relevant, in passing upon the reasonableness of restraints by cooperative associations, to consider exactly what is their
relative bargaining power in any particular instance. While there has been considerable increase in the economic importance of cooperatives, their economic power
can easily be exaggerated unless one considers both the still relatively small amount
of buying and selling done by cooperatives and also the fact that frequently they
62312 U.

S. 219 (1941).

"See notes 44-46 supra, for cases under the fisheries' cooperative law. In United States v. Dairy
Cooperative Ass'n, 49 F. Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1943), the Department of Justice obtained an indictment
against an agricultural cooperative association for violation of the federal antitrust laws. It was said
by the court to be the first case brought by the Department against a farmers' cooperative, not acting
in concert with others, in which the cooperative was charged with acts monopolistic in character.
Judge McCulloch granted a motion of the defendant to find it not guilty. The court thought Congress
by the Clayton Act had said that agricultural cooperatives were not to be punished, even though they
became monopolistic. Judge McCulloch said, "I'am asked to scuttle the plain language of the Clayton
id. at
Act as to cooperatives, as anti-labor courts scuttled the labor provisions of the same Act .
475. The opinion did not mention the Capper-Volstead Act.
Cf. Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Industries, 41 F. Supp. 535 (N. D. Calif. '94'). This case involved
a cooperative association of boat-owners, similar to the one noted in the Columbia River Packers case,
supra, note 44. While the Clayton Act gives no exemption to such cooperatives, they are authorized
by the Act of June 25, 1934, 48 STAT. 1214, 15 U.S.C. §§521, 522 (194o). The statute is similar to
the Capper-Volstead Act with the substitution of the Secretary of Commerce for the Secretary of
Agriculture. The court said that the fact that the Secretary of Commerce had not acted does not indicate that an illegal combination may not exist. The court awarded triple damages for violation of
the Sherman Law. The Association was not acting in concert with others. See, for a subsequent development not connected with the principal issue, The Ocean Gift, Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Industries, Inc. 48 F. Supp. 625 (N. D. Calif. 1942). Manaka was a resident Japanese alien.
What is perhaps the most important agricultural cooperative association antitrust case decided subsequent to the Clayton Act and prior to the Capper-Volstead Act is United States v. King, 229 Fed. 275
(D. Mass. 1915), 250 Fed. 9o8 (D. Mass. 1916). The defendant cooperative, the Aroostook Potato
Shippers' Association, which controlled 75 per cent of all interstate potato shipments from Arootook
County, through a committee prepared a blacklist of undesirable receivers. Members were forbidden
to deal with a blacklisted person. The list was also circulated to commission merchants and others,
who were informed they would be blacklisted if they dealt in potatoes with those on the undesirable
list. The defendant was indicted for conspiracy in restraint of trade. A demurrer to the indictment
was overruled. The court said the secondary boycott was not, under the Clayton Act, a legitimate means
of carrying out the objects of the association.
e See Comment, The Bauis of Labor Exemptions from the Anti-trust Laws, 54 YAa L. J. 853 (1945).
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participate in only one phase of the distributive process. 5 Although the cooperatives may come close to controlling parts of the marketing machinery for certain
fruits and nuts in particular areas, their producEs are usually in competition with
similar products from other areas as well as with even more significant competition from other products. Cooperatives may have a high degree of economic power
in certain regions and at some point in the marketing process. Their present size,
rate of growth, and, on the whole, their policies, give little cause to fear the assertion by them of any tyrannical economic power at any early time, if at all, on
the national level, and that is the type of activity with which the federal antitrust laws are primarily concerned.
The foregoing considerations do not justify the conclusion that agricultural
cooperatives could assert economic power combined with political power with impunity. Their immunity under the aititrust laws is by no means so explicit
as that of labor organizations. Cooperative associations, even if technically nonprofit, are engaged in business. They compete with other business in a different
way from that in which unions compete with employers. To be comparable, the
unions would have to engage directly in productive enterprise of their own, for
example in the making of phonograph records. The Clayton Act provision that
labor is not a commodity may point to a further distinction between labor organizations and cooperatives. Furthermore, while it may be true that unduly
restrictive decisions by the Supreme Court in labor cases induced Congress to
grant almost unlimited power to labor unions, the effect on public opinion of uncontrolled labor-union conduct, and the consequent response by Congress with new
labor legislation, suggests the query whether the Supreme Court's labor decisions
on restraint of trade may not have reflected the underlying public sentiment as
to the proper meaning and effect of antitrust legislation. The political history of
the United States has already shown that both business and labor for a time, by
adroit strategy and pressure, can gain special privilege. Both overreached thehiselves
to an extent that aroused condemnation by a popular majority. Farm organizations may well be satisfied with the degree of favor they now enjoy with government, even assuming a somewhat conservative judicial attitude toward their antitrust immunities.
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court and other courts have given new importance to the idea of monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherinan Act." Perhaps
"See Paul, The Jusdfiability of the Policy of Exempting Farmers' Markceting and Purchasing Cooperative Organizations from Federal Income Taxes, 29 MiNz. L. REV. 343, 356 et seq. (x945).
"See especially American Tobacco Co., Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., L J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
et al. v. United States, 328 U. S. 78r (946), and United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F. 2d 46
(C.C.A. 2d 1945). The latter case is a final decision on certificate from the Supreme Court because
of a lack of a quorum. The certificate was issued under authority of Act of February a, 19o3, as
amended June 9, 1944, 32 STAT. 843, 58 STAT. 272, 15 U.S.C. §29 (1940). The Aluminum case was
tried before Circuit Judges Learned Hand, Augustus Hand and Swan. The opinion was by Learned
Hand. See also Cahill, Recent Trends in the Antitrust Laws, i RacoRw (Ass'n of the Bar of the City
of New York) 201 (1946); Levi, The Antitrust aws and Monopoly, 14 U. op Cm. L. REv. x53
(1947); Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. oF Cm..L. Rlv. 567
(r947); Note, Enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 54 YALE L. J. 86o (1945).
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the conceptions of monopoly as held by the lawyer and the economist are coming
closer together.67 For a long time we have been justified in assuming that mere
size was not an offense under the Sherman Law. 68 The emphasis in the decisions
was on predatory practices and restraints regarded as unreasonable. Recent cases
such as those involving the Aluminum Company and the three tobacco companies
(American, Reynolds, and Liggett &Myers) 6 9 indicate that mere size, at least measured by national standards, in the future must be given much more attention. It
is possible that this significant development may be extended to dominance of the
market even where the market in question is only a small segment of the national
economy, and the product involved, like aluminum, is in active competition with
other products over which the alleged offender has no control. The space limits
of this discussion do not permit a detailed analysis of recent developments in the
general field of antitrust laws. It is perhaps enough to say that these developments
should have the serious attention of those who make the policies of cooperative
associations. With the exclusiveness of the enforcement procedure by the Secretary
of Agriculture in doubt in cooperative cases, and with the added fact that in any
event the Secretary could not successfully challenge the policy of an administration
of which he is a part, any approach to complete control of even a single agricultural
product might subject the dominant cooperative to attack under the antitrust laws.
Such control could be permitted by Congress and, as has been indicated, it is arguable that it is already permitted by the aggregate of federal legislation favorable to
cooperatives, subject only to the potential protection of the public by the Secretary
of Agriculture against unfair prices. The public, however, as represented by the
Government, might not agree with agricultural interests as to fairness of price.
What if a single cooperative should have the same dominance over raisins that the
Aluminum Company has over aluminum ingots? What if cooperative associations
respectively controlling walnuts, pecans, and peanuts should create a single marketing agency? What if there should be a similar agency for California and Florida
oranges, or for Florida, Texas, and California grapefruit? What if marketing
control should concern itself, not so much with price as with division of domestic
and foreign markets? From what I know of the cooperative leaders, I doubt if
they will subject themselves to attack. Their present policies suggest no violation
of the antitrust laws as presently interpreted. If their power should increaseand power is seductive, and it is easy to be deceived by self-interest-the cooperative agricultural associations may find their antitrust immunity something less
than complete. The safe rule for the farmers' organizations is to obey the prin17Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 Y..LE L. J. 34 (x937); I AmEsmucAN INDvWuAL
Emk-P
Sysmrm, c. X, Prices, 481; H id., cc. XII, XIII, Competition and Monopoly, 589; Donovan,
Economic Concentration and the Antitrust Laws, 29, 1947 Proc. Sec. Corp. Banking and Merc. Law,
A.B.A.
"See United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 251 U. S. 417 (1920); United States v.
International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 93 (1927).

"eSupra note 66.
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ciples of the competitive system. Monopoly power as a condition of profit is largely
a delusion in any event. It means stagnation instead of progress. Even if it could
be attained as to any product, the rivalry of other products would make the victory an empty one. The consumer is still king in America, and any business program based on the assumption that the consumer is a fool will pay for its error
in reduced profits. The future success of cooperative farm marketing depends
upon adherence to the practices of aggressive competition for the favor of the
70
ultimate consumer.
loSee Note, Budness Regulation: Recent Application to Cooperatie Organizations, 29 CoRN. L.
(943); AoRicuLtnuxR
Agricultur, 1945).
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